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Although laws restricting smoking in restaurants are becoming commonplace, most
research has focused on either the health beneﬁts that laws may provide customers
and workers or whether laws harm owners. But while smoking laws may directly
alter proﬁts, owners may alter prices, output, and other business attributes in ways
that aﬀect the welfare of customers and workers. This study examines whether
restaurant and bar owners alter prices, entertainment, hours of operation and
other business attributes in response to local smoking laws. Substantial support is
found for these attribute changes in the Wisconsin hospitality industry. One implica
tion is that an overall assessment of the desirability of smoking laws should consider
economic eﬀects imposed on owners, customers and workers, as well as health
beneﬁts that follow laws.

I. INTRODUCTION
Laws that ban or restrict smoking in restaurants are
becoming more prevalent. Public health groups advocate
such laws on the basis of controlling second-hand smoke
and/or possible health beneﬁts to non-smoking customers
and workers. However, in order to examine the overall
impact of smoking restrictions, the economic eﬀects of
these policies should also be examined. These laws may
directly alter proﬁts and changes in business environments
may lead owners to alter prices, output, and other business
attributes in ways that aﬀect the welfare of all customers
and workers.
An overall assessment of the desirability of smoking laws
then should consider all of these eﬀects. While a few studies
examine the eﬀects of smoking laws on restaurant owners,
there is little research that examines the economic eﬀects
imposed on customers and workers. This paper examines
the economic eﬀects imposed on owners, customers
and workers in roughly 1,000 restaurants and bars in
Wisconsin. Wisconsin provides a good case study because
its adult smoking rate is 23.7%, which is similar to the
median smoking rate of 22.8% for all states.1 The data

set contains detailed information at the individual business
level and provides data on establishments that have been
subjected to local smoking laws as well as those that currently operate without them. The analysis therefore examines whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
actual and predicted eﬀects of laws. This comparison is
important for assessing predictions made concerning the
extension of laws onto other localities.
The paper begins with a survey of the literature on the
economic eﬀects of smoking laws on restaurants and bars.
Next, a series of hypotheses on the relationship between
smoking laws and owners, customers and employees are
developed, followed by the presentation of data and an
empirical model. An overall assessment of the evidence
concludes the paper.

II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Most of the literature in this area addresses whether or not
smoking bans lower the revenues (as a proxy for proﬁts) of
restaurants and bars. This literature follows one of two
directions. One direction focuses on impacts on individual
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1999 data obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Wisconsin ranks 35th out of 50 states when listed from lowest
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owners. Dunham and Marlow (2000b) examined the dis
tribution of expected eﬀects of smoking laws on revenues
using data from a nationwide survey of 1,300 restaurants
and bars. For restaurants, 6% of owners predicted that
bans raise revenues, 39% predicted lower revenues, and
55% predicted no changes. For bars and taverns, a ban
was predicted to raise revenues by 2% of owners, lower
revenues by 83%, and produce no change by
13%. Predictions of gains, losses and no eﬀects on revenues
are found to be consistent with how owners allocate seating
within their establishments. That is, the lower was seating
allocated to non-smoking use, the higher the probability
that an owner predicted that a smoking ban lowered rev
enues. This result indicates that seating allocations are
made on the basis of proﬁts, as is consistent with an eﬃ
cient private accommodation market.
The other research direction aggregates all establishments
into one ‘community-wide’ impact. A number of studies
have concluded that businesses do not suﬀer reduced sales
as a result of bans. Glantz and Smith (1994) compare 15
cities with smoking laws with 15 matched control group
cities. They conclude: ‘[L]egislators and government oﬃcials
can enact such health and safety requirements to protect
patrons and employees in restaurants from the toxins
in second-hand tobacco smoke without the fear of adverse
economic consequences.’ In their study of smoking laws
in North Carolina, Goldstein and Sobel (1998) conclude:
‘Even in the number one tobacco-producing state in the
U.S., ETS regulations present no adverse economic impact,
and there is no need for exceptions to the ordinances based
on such fears.’ Sciacca and Ratliﬀ (1998) conclude in their
study of Arizona ﬁrms that: ‘This study seems to indicate
that prohibiting smoking in all Flagstaﬀ restaurants has
had no eﬀect on total restaurant sales.’
Dunham and Winegarden (1999) examined data from
the 1996 survey of restaurant owners discussed above in
Dunham and Marlow (2000b) and found that customers
patronize hospitality establishments in order to placate
three distinct needs: the desire for food, the desire for social
companionship and the desire to seek status. Smoking bans
appear to positively impact restaurants that supply the ﬁrst
need, while harming those that supply the other two. The
authors conclude that the actual impact of the smoking
ban on a particular restaurant depends on how that
establishment meets the three needs.
The literature review indicates three important research
issues that will extend the overall understanding of the
welfare eﬀects of smoking laws. First, most studies have
only considered the welfare of owners, either individually
or collectively, thus missing possible eﬀects imposed on
customers and workers. Second, in addition to focusing
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on the economic eﬀect on businesses, the existing literature
tends to examine revenues, or sales taxes, rather than busi
ness proﬁts or consumer costs, thus providing an incom
plete measure of economic welfare. Third, studies of
individual owners have focused on expected rather than
actual eﬀects of laws because of limitations of data collec
tion. Biases that complicate the understanding of the eco
nomic eﬀects of smoking laws may arise when expected and
actual eﬀects of laws diﬀer. As discussed below, the data
examined in this study address these three problem areas.

I I I . T H E E F F E C T S O F S M O K I N G LA W S O N
B U SI N E S S E S A N D C O N S U M E R S
Governments have justiﬁed the imposition of smoking
restrictions by claiming that smoking creates negative
externalities and harms the health of non-smokers.2
While the issue of externalities is clearly important
for public policy, this paper concentrates on the
economic eﬀects that smoking laws may exert on
owners, customers and workers in the restaurant and bar
industries. Examination of economic eﬀects provides
another piece to the overall assessment of the desirability
of smoking laws.
In the absence of smoking laws, smoking policies are set
by owners who determine air space allocation within their
establishments. That is, owners decide in which areas
smoking will be allowed, as well as whether to invest in
smoking patios, partitions that separate smokers from
non-smokers, and air ﬁltration. Coase (1960) provides a
general framework that may be applied to how private
owners allocate their air space in cases where externalities
may be present.3
Coase (1960) argued that resources could be allocated
eﬃciently as long as they are privately owned, transferable
and transactions costs are trivial. This appears to be the
case with air space within private establishments. The space
in the restaurant is privately owned and, in eﬀect, owners
rent it to customers who value these resources the most.
Smokers and non-smokers compete for the scarce resources
and owners will allocate space to the demander with the
highest bid. The same process is consistent with other allo
cation decisions of businesses. Department stores allocate
space between men’s clothing and women’s garments, gro
cery stores allocate space between meats and vegetables,
and theatres allocate between comedy and drama. In the
case of restaurants, owners determine what smoking poli
cies are consistent with maximum proﬁts by taking into
account the competing demands of smoking and non
smoking customers. More air space will be smoke-free as
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non-smokers out-bid smokers, and vice versa. Whether
owners cater solely to smokers, to nonsmokers, or accom
modate both, depends on customer preferences and the
marginal costs of accommodation.4
The other condition presented by Coase is that trans
actions costs be trivial. At ﬁrst glance, it would appear
highly unlikely that smoking and non-smoking customers
could separately negotiate over the air space because this
might mean that policies change by the hour or day, or that
customers must declare how they value the air space.
However, owners intermediate between smoking and
non-smoking customers thus eliminating the need for
costly negotiations. Owners have proﬁt incentives to allo
cate resources eﬃciently and air space allocation will be
eﬃcient when they cannot change smoking policies and
raise proﬁts at the same time.
An important implication of the resource allocation pro
cess is that owners will not adopt uniform smoking policies
when customers exhibit diverse smoking preferences and
owners face diverse marginal costs of accommodation.
Marginal accommodation costs are likely to diﬀer between
establishments because some buildings may be more easily
adapted to physical separations and air ﬁltration systems.
Moreover, some owners may face customers who believe
that separations or air ﬁltration systems are eﬀective in
removing smoke and others may have customers who
believe that smoking should be forbidden. The basic
point remains that a diverse set of smoking policies exists
prior to smoking laws because a one-size-ﬁts-all policy is
not eﬃcient when customers display diverse smoking
preferences and owners face diﬀerent marginal costs of
accommodation.5
Smoking laws shift ownership of the air space from busi
ness owners to individuals who prefer that government
restrictions or bans take place. However, restaurant owners
are now forbidden from ‘selling’ resources to smokers,
even if they could out-bid non-smokers. Air space
resources are therefore no longer transferable and proﬁts
may fall unless business owners somehow fully shift bur
dens of the law onto customers or workers. Of course, cases
may arise where laws are consistent with pre-law policies,
but these events may be uncommon in locations where
smoking preferences and marginal accommodation costs
vary considerably across businesses.
The discussion thus far suggests the hypothesis that
smoking laws exert three possible eﬀects on proﬁts, assum
ing that owners proﬁt-maximized prior to government
restrictions. One, proﬁts fall when laws lower demand
and/or raise costs. Two, proﬁts increase when laws raise
demand and/or lower costs. Three, proﬁts do not change
4

when laws do not aﬀect demand or costs, or changes in
demand are equal and opposite to changes in costs.
Another hypothesis is that bars are more likely to experi
ence proﬁt declines than restaurants. Dunham and Marlow
(2000b) report evidence indicating that bars are more than
twice as likely to experience revenue drops as restaurants.
Unlike patrons in restaurants, bar customers often partici
pate in dining, drinking, listening to music, dancing, and
playing pool or darts whereby they roam during visits
interacting with other patrons. Bar owners may also ﬁnd
it more costly to separate smokers and nonsmokers
because it is too costly to provide separate bands, dance
ﬂoors, poolrooms, etc., for both smokers and non-smokers.
As discussed above, previous studies do not address
whether the economic eﬀects of smoking laws extend well
beyond eﬀects on individual owners when burdens are
shifted onto their customers and workers. A smoking law
may represent a cost for restaurants and bars and, as with
any cost, owners have incentives to attempt to shift bur
dens onto others. Food and drink prices may rise or fall
and meal portions, hours of operation, service quality
are other attributes that might undergo change. Owners
may also shift burdens onto workers through lower
compensation or added responsibilities.6
It is hypothesized that owners will not follow identical
strategies when they attempt to shift burdens onto others.
For example, owners with price elastic demands may tend
to raise prices less often than owners facing price inelastic
demands. Proﬁt changes and the manner and extent to
which burdens are shifted onto consumers and workers
may be inﬂuenced by many factors including: age and
size of business, type of business, the percentage of custo
mers who smoke, and the competitive nature and size of
local markets.
An important implication of this discussion is that
simple observation of sales or proﬁt changes following a
smoking law may oﬀer a limited picture of the true welfare
eﬀects. Higher proﬁts, for instance, may be consistent with
higher prices and lower compensation for workers thus
clouding the issue of how desirable a smoking law is for
society. Clearly, there are many possible changes when we
consider eﬀects imposed on individual owners, customers
and workers.

I V . DE S C R I P T I O N A ND S U M M A R Y O F
SU R V E Y D A T A
A total of 978 owners of restaurants, bars and taverns in
Wisconsin were surveyed by ETC Institute of Olathe,
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Table 1. Eﬀects of restrictions on proﬁts (actual and predicted)

Decrease
Increase
No change
Don’t know

All restaurants
(n ¼ 550)

Restaurants with
govt restrictions
or bans
(n ¼ 172)

Restaurants with
no restrictions
(n ¼ 378)

All bars
(n ¼ 428)

54% (296)
3% (18)
37% (206)
5% (30)

38% (66)
5% (8)
50% (86)
7% (12)

61% (148)
3% (10)
32% (120)
5% (18)

81% (345)
1% (2)
13% (55)
6% (26)

Kansas, during February and March 2001.7 Of those sur
veyed, 56% consisted of restaurant owners (550) and 44%
consisted of bar and tavern owners (428). This sample
represents precision of at least þ/� 3.3% at the 95%
level of conﬁdence.
Potential for bias is always a concern with survey data.8
Owners may oppose smoking laws for personal reasons
and, as a result, exaggerate proﬁt losses and changes in
prices, hours of operation and other business attributes.
Those who favour laws may also exaggerate proﬁt gains,
falsely report no changes in proﬁts, or in other ways indi
cate incorrect information regarding other issues. With
no information on the likelihood of misinformation, it
remains unclear whether personal views would over-ride
preferences for maximizing the value of ﬁrms.
This study is the ﬁrst to examine both predictions and
actual changes regarding proﬁts and other variables.
Owners subject to smoking restrictions and bans reported
actual eﬀects, while those who were not subject to laws
reported predictions. Thirty-one percent of restaurant
owners, and virtually no bar owners, were subject to
restrictions or bans, thus providing information on actual
eﬀects of smoking laws. Information on predictions and
actual changes will be compared to determine if signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between these two groups exist.
Even without biased responses related to personal views
of owners, it is likely that signiﬁcant diﬀerences will exist
between responses by those subject to government laws and
those who are not. Dunham and Marlow (2000a) support
this prediction when they conclude that smoking laws are
passed in states with relatively few smokers and therefore
businesses subject to such laws are less likely to experience
lower proﬁts simply because they service fewer smokers.
This prediction is consistent with the survey data examined
here because the average percentage of smoking customers
is 28% for restaurants with laws and 40% for those
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without.9 In other words, restaurants located in areas
that do not have smoking restrictions service 43% more
smoking customers than those in locations with them.
As the analysis shows, businesses serving relatively few
smokers will experience less harm than businesses serving
relatively many.
Responses also support the view that the private market
provides a diverse array of smoking policies – thus support
ing the prediction that proﬁt changes will not be uniform
across establishments. For example, 18% of restaurants,
but only 0.2% of bars, provide smoke-free facilities,
while 34% of restaurants allow smoking throughout, and
97% of bars allow smoking throughout. On average, 44%
of seating in restaurants is non-smoking.10 For restaurants
with smoking restrictions, average non-smoking seating
use is 56% and, for those without restrictions, average
non-smoking seating is 34%.

V. EFFECTS ON OWNERS
Table 1 displays responses in four categories to the ques
tion of how proﬁts would change following a smoking ban:
all restaurant owners, restaurant owners currently subject
to bans or restrictions, owners not subject to bans or
restrictions, and all bar owners. Responses for restaurant
owners without any bans or restrictions and for bar owners
are predictions of impacts, while responses for those
subject to bans or restrictions are actual impacts.
Responses are consistent with previous studies that indi
cate that smoking bans do not impose identical economic
eﬀects across establishments. Proﬁt gains are the least com
mon response, as indicated by 5% or fewer owners, thus
indicating that bans provide relatively few economic bene
ﬁts. Lower proﬁts are indicated by 38% of restaurant own
ers currently subjected to bans, 61% of restaurant owners
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Table 2. Logit estimations of proﬁt reduction

constant
nsi, non-smoking seating
alcoholi, % alcohol revenues
chaini, chain dummy
agei, years in business
seatsi, number of seats
Log likelihood
Observations
Obs. with dep ¼ 0
Obs. with dep ¼ 1

All restaurants

Restaurants with
restrictions or bans

Restaurants without
restrictions or bans

0.60
2.47
�0.02*
7.68
0.02*
3.41
�0.21
0.60
0.0001
0.02
0.002**
2.44
�276.47
496
218
278

�0.10
0.20
�0.01**
2.54
0.02***
1.66
�0.20
0.40
0.004
0.50
0.002***
1.75
�90.11
149
88
61

0.80
2.72
�0.02*
6.76
0.01*
2.75
�0.29
0.60
�0.003
0.43
0.003***
1.80
�229.50
347
130
217

Notes: t-statistics below estimated coeﬃcients; *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.

with no restrictions, and 81% of bar owners. Responses
support the above prediction that owners not subject to
laws predict proﬁt losses more often than those currently
subject to smoking laws. The higher percentage of bar
owners predicting proﬁt losses than restaurant owners
is also consistent with Dunham and Marlow (2000b).
A qualitative choice model estimates the probability that
a restaurant owner with a given set of attributes reports
that bans lower proﬁts. Bar owners are excluded here
because a vast majority (81%) of their responses indicated
lower proﬁts. The following logit model is estimated and
follows the model estimated in Dunham and Marlow
(2000b):11
profitchangei ¼ fðnsi , alcoholi , chaini , agei , seatsi Þ

ð1Þ

where nsi ¼ percentage of seating allocated to non-smoking
use, alcoholi ¼ share of revenues from alcohol, chaini ¼ 1 if
ﬁrm is a member of a corporate chain; 0 otherwise, agei ¼
years owner has been in business, seatsi ¼ number of seats.
The dependent variable proﬁtchangei ¼ 0 if owner has
experienced or expects no change or a rise in proﬁt,
and ¼ 1 if proﬁt falls. As discussed above, previous studies
of individual owners focused on revenues or sales and,
because they do not measure proﬁts, do not provide clear
measurement of economic eﬀects on owners.
The percentage of seating allocated to non-smoking use
nsi is expected to exert a negative inﬂuence on the prob
ability that proﬁts fall since this variable indicates how
many non-smokers are served. Proﬁt losses are predicted
to be more likely the lower the share of non-smoking
seating.
11

The share of revenues from alcohol, alcoholi, is expected
to exert a positive inﬂuence on the likelihood of proﬁts
falling because higher alcohol revenues indicate a more
‘bar-like’ atmosphere that is more social. As discussed
above, bar owners have been found to be much more likely
to experience proﬁt reduction thus suggesting that losses
are more likely in restaurants that are more ‘bar-like’ than
other restaurants.
Membership in a chain is measured by chaini and equals
1 if ﬁrm is a member of a corporate chain, and equals 0
otherwise. Whether a business is part of a corporate chain
is also expected to inﬂuence responses if chain members
oﬀer greater accommodation of smokers and nonsmokers
as an element of overall corporate strategy. This view sug
gests that chain members are less likely to experience proﬁt
reduction with the expected sign on chaini being negative.
Age of business, agei, is hypothesized to positively aﬀect
probabilities of proﬁt reduction as accommodation costs
may be positively related to age of buildings and older
ﬁrms may accommodate less, given that they tend to
cater to more established and stable customer bases than
newer businesses.
Number of seats, seatsi, is expected to exert a positive
inﬂuence when scale economies exist in accommodation
when, for instance, it may be cheaper to separate smokers
from nonsmokers in larger establishments. Larger restau
rants then are predicted to experience proﬁt loss more
often because they are more likely to have accommodated
relatively more smokers prior to a government ban.
Table 2 displays logit estimations for three samples: all
restaurant owners, owners subject to smoking laws (actual

Dunham and Marlow (2000b) ﬁnd non-smoking seating (negative), chain (negative), age (positive) variables exerting signiﬁcant
inﬂuences on their logit model of whether or not an owner experiences a fall in revenues.

Table 3. Attribute changes (observations in parentheses)

Eﬀects on consumers
Raise prices
Lower prices
Introduce promotions
More entertainment
Less entertainment
Lengthen hours
Lower hours
Eﬀects on workers
Lower beneﬁts
Raise responsibilities

Restaurants with
govt restrictions or bans
(n ¼ 172)

Restaurants with
no restrictions
(n ¼ 378 )

All bars
(n ¼ 428)

20% (35)
3% (5)
22% (37)
2% (4)
3% (6)
3% (6)
7% (12)

31% (118)
2% (7)
31% (116)
7% (25)
5% (18)
4% (15)
21% (78)

34% (145)
7% (28)
35% (151)
19% (79)
11% (48)
4% (19)
29% (124)

7% (12)
9% (16)

17% (65)
14% (52)

16% (68)
10% (42)

changes) and owners not subject to laws (predictions).
Estimation supports expectations concerning non-smoking
seating, alcohol revenues and number of seats. Higher
shares of non-smoking seating lower the probability that
owners expect adverse revenue eﬀects while higher revenue
shares from alcohol raise the probability. These eﬀects are
signiﬁcant for all three samples, but are weaker in cases of
owners subject to laws. As discussed above, proﬁt losses
are less likely for owners subject to laws simply because
their customers would tend to be more favorable to those
restrictions in the ﬁrst place than communities that have
not adopted such laws. Number of seats exerts a positive
inﬂuence on the likelihood of proﬁt loss in all three estima
tions. Membership in a corporate chain and age of business
exert no signiﬁcant eﬀects on the probability of proﬁt loss
in any of three estimations.
In sum, logit estimations indicate three signiﬁcant inﬂu
ences on the likelihood that an owner reports lower proﬁts
following a smoking ban: shares of seating devoted to non
smoking use, share of revenues from alcohol, and number
of seats.

VI. EFFECTS ON CUSTOMERS AND
WORKERS
Consumers can also be aﬀected when owners re-arrange
their businesses in response to smoking laws. Table 3 dis
plays economic eﬀects stemming from whether owners
raise or lower prices, introduce promotions, raise or
lower entertainment, and raise or lower hours of operation.
Responses are displayed for three groups: restaurant own
ers subject to smoking laws (actual responses), restaurant
owners not subject to laws (predictions), and all bar own
ers. Twenty percent of restaurant owners subject to bans,
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31% of owners without laws, and 34% of bar owners
indicate that bans cause price hikes. In contrast, 3% of
restaurant owners subject to laws, 2% of owners without
laws, and 7% of bar owners indicate that bans cause price
reductions.
Twenty-two percent of restaurant owners subject to
laws, 31% of restaurant owners without laws, and 35%
of bar owners indicate that bans cause them to introduce
promotions. Few restaurant owners indicate that bans
cause them to raise or lower entertainment; however, bar
owners were more likely to indicate entertainment
changes.12 Finally, only 3–4% of all owners indicate that
they would stay open longer, but from 7–29% would
reduce hours of operation.
Table 3 also displays eﬀects imposed on workers follow
ing a smoking ban. Seven percent of owners subject to
laws, 17% of owners without laws, and 16% of bar owners
indicate that a smoking ban causes them to lower beneﬁts
to workers. Nine percent of restaurant owners subject to
laws, 14% of restaurant owners not subject to laws, and
10% of bar owners indicate that they have or would raise
responsibilities of workers.
An important implication here is that evidence of gains
or no change in proﬁts indicate only that laws exert no
adverse economic eﬀects on owners, but reveals nothing
about attribute changes that inﬂuence the welfare of cus
tomers and workers. Table 4 summarizes the results of logit
estimations where attribute changes are regressed against a
variable indicating whether or not an owner experiences a
proﬁt reduction. A ‘þ’ eﬀect indicates that owners with
proﬁt reductions are more likely to undertake a given attri
bute, while a ‘�’ eﬀect indicates that they are less likely to
pursue it. No eﬀects, or blanks in the table, indicate that
pursuit of a given attribute is unrelated to whether an
owner experiences falling proﬁts.

Nineteen percent would raise entertainment and 11% would lower entertainment.

Table 4. Summary of whether owners with proﬁt losses undertake attribute changes more often than other
owners (þ or � eﬀects, when signiﬁcant)

Eﬀects on consumers
Raise prices
Lower prices
Introduce promotions
More entertainment
Less entertainment
Lengthen hours
Lower hours
Eﬀects on workers
Lower beneﬁts
Raise responsibilities

Restaurants with
govt restrictions
or bans
(n ¼ 172)

Restaurants with
no restrictions
(n ¼ 378 )

All bars
(n ¼ 428)

þ*

þ*

þ*

þ*

þ*

þ***

þ*
þ**
þ***

þ*

þ*

þ*

þ**

þ*
þ*

þ*

þ**

Notes: t-statistics below estimated coeﬃcients; *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
levels, respectively.

Logit estimations indicate that, for all establishments,
proﬁt reductions signiﬁcantly raise the likelihood that an
owner raises prices, introduces promotions, lowers enter
tainment, and lowers hours of operation. Only restaurant
owners not subject to smoking laws indicate that proﬁt
reduction raises the likelihood of increasing entertainment.
Lower beneﬁts to workers are more likely to arise when
establishments suﬀer proﬁt reductions, but only restaurant
owners not subject to smoking laws are more likely to raise
responsibilities when proﬁts fall. Probabilities of under
taking price drops and lengthening hours of operation
are unrelated to whether or not there is a proﬁt reduction.

VII. CONCLUSIONS
This study is an initial attempt at uncovering the economic
eﬀects of smoking laws experienced by owners, customers
and workers. While previous research by public health
advocates has focused on health beneﬁts enjoyed by non
smoking customers and restaurant workers, a thorough
assessment of the eﬀects of smoking laws should also
include economic beneﬁts and costs that extend to owners,
customers and workers.
This examination of Wisconsin restaurants and bars
indicates that smoking bans exert eﬀects on proﬁts that
vary by establishment, and that bars are much more likely
to experience proﬁt losses than restaurants. Owners not
subject to laws more often stated that bans lower proﬁts,
but this result is consistent with the view that locations with
smoking laws service relatively few smokers. This suggests
that predictions of proﬁt loss are likely to be understated
when they are projected onto other localities because

locations with laws tend to service relatively fewer smokers
than locations without laws.
Economic eﬀects experienced by owners extend beyond
those who cater to many smoking customers. In addition to
seating devoted to non-smoking use, which measures
importance of smoking customers, alcohol sales and size
of restaurant inﬂuence the probability of lower proﬁts.
Owners of larger ‘bar-like’ restaurants are more likely to
experience lower proﬁts than others, holding constant the
degree to which they cater to smokers.
Economic eﬀects are also found to extend beyond own
ers as bans lead to changes in prices, promotions, entertain
ment, hours of operation, and beneﬁts and responsibilities
of workers. Most actions were found to be more likely
when establishments experience a proﬁt reduction, and
eﬀects are not isolated to smokers.
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